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Accounting practice, fiscal decentralization and corruption 
Abstract 
In prior studies, accounting and decentralization corruption solutions have so far been 
analysed in isolation. In this article, we connect these two strands of literature on corruption. 
Understanding this connection is important because weak financial accounting and reporting 
systems can inhibit monitoring incentives and thus reduce decentralization benefits in 
countering corruption. We argue that the effectiveness of decentralization as an anti-
corruption barrier is complemented by the quality of the accounting practice in a country. 
Using multiple sources of data, we find that decentralization has a positive and increasing 
effect on reducing corruption among countries with a igh-quality accounting practice. In 
contrast, decentralization has a negative and decreasing effect on reducing corruption among 
countries with weak-quality accounting practices. These findings are robust to alternative 
measures of accounting, decentralization and corruption and to endogeneity tests. Our 
findings demonstrate the crucial information role of accounting in enhancing decentralization 
monitoring mechanisms and in thereby reducing corruption.  
 
Keywords: accounting practice, fiscal decentralization, corruption, public sector accounting, 
financial reporting standards, IPSASs 
JEL – H11; H77; D73; M41 
This research has not received any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, 














Page 1 of 48 
 
1. Introduction 1 
Corruption is a key concern on the agenda of supranational organizations and is enshrined 2 
under Goal No 16 of the new United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).1 It is 3 
estimated that businesses and individuals across the world pay about $ 1.5 trillion annually in 4 
bribes and that the poor are more likely to pay a higher proportion of their income in bribes 5 
than the rich are likely to pay (World Bank, 2017). A central and recurring theme in policy 6 
debates and the corruption literature is how specific policy interventions, including 7 
accounting practice and decentralization reforms, can help reduce corruption. These two 8 
policy interventions are part of the key elements of public sector reforms, collectively 9 
referred to as “New” Public Management (NPM) (e.g., Hood, 1991, 1995; Pollitt, 1995), that 10 
continue to be promoted by supranational organizations as important mechanisms for 11 
enhancing transparency, accountability, and governance in the public sector and thereby 12 
helping to counteract corruption (e.g., IFAC, 1996, 2017; Moretti, 2016; World Bank, 1997).  13 
Prior research acknowledges that NPM mechanisms are interrelated and interlinked 14 
(Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1995) and that weak financial accounting and reporting systems can 15 
stifle the citizens’ monitoring incentives, thereby reducing decentralization benefits 16 
(Bardhan, 2002; World Bank, 2001). Additionally, most studies have separately examined 17 
both the relationship between accounting practice and corruption and the relationship 18 
between corruption and decentralization. However, rsearch has not yet considered the 19 
combined roles of accounting practice and decentralization on corruption or whether they 20 
                                                 
1 For example, the targets set out under goal 16 include the following: (1) to substantially reduce 
corruption and bribery in all their forms; (2) to develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all  
levels; and (3) to ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all 
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complement each other in reducing corruption. Our paper aims to fill this gap and stands at 1 
the intersection between the accounting and decentralization strands of corruption literature.  2 
This paper is motivated by and builds upon the accounting practice and corruption 3 
literature. First, we build upon the literature on the relationship between accounting practice 4 
and corruption. Generally, the accounting literature on, particularly public sector accounting, 5 
has focused on the factors that determine a country’s adoption and application of high-quality 6 
accounting practices, with reference to accrual accounting systems and International Public 7 
Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) (e.g., Adhikari & Gårseth-Nesbakk, 2016; Christiaens, 8 
Vanhee, Manes-Rossi, Aversano, & Van Cauwenberge, 2015; Pina, Torres, & Yetano, 2009). 9 
This focus is merited mainly because high-quality accounting practices can facilitate the 10 
production of credible accounting information with more monitoring information and regular 11 
and timely financial reports, which can enhance transp rency and accountability in the public 12 
sector (e.g., Groot & Budding, 2008; Mack & Ryan, 2006). However, to date, the impact of 13 
these high-quality accounting practices on corruption has received little attention in this 14 
literature, except for a few explicit cross-country studies (Houqe & Monem, 2016; Kimbro, 15 
2002; Malagueño, Albrecht, Ainge, & Stephens, 2010) and within-country case studies with 16 
mixed findings (e.g., Goddard et al., 2016; Neu et al., 2013a, 2013b; Sargiacomo et al., 17 
2015). 2 In this study, we consider the role of decentralization, and use an accounting measure 18 
that captures experts’ perceptions on the strength of financial auditing and reporting practices 19 
in a country and thus extend on these prior studies. 20 
                                                 
2 Using case studies, several closely related studies ocument within country evidence (Goddard, 
Assad, Issa, Malagila, & Mkasiwa, 2016; Neu, Everett, & Rahaman, 2009; Neu, Everett, & Rahaman, 2013a; 
Neu, Everett, Rahaman, & Martinez, 2013b; Sargiacomo, Ianni, D’Andreamatteo, & Servalli, 2015) and provide 
theoretical explanations on why accounting—and accounting processes and outputs—can be problematic in 
curbing corruption (Everett, Neu, & Rahaman, 2007; Hoskin, 2015; Johnstone, 2015; Neu, Everett, & Rahaman, 
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 Second, we contribute to a broad range of literature on the relationship between 1 
decentralization and corruption (e.g., Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; de Mello & Barenstein, 2 
2001; Fan, Lin, & Treisman, 2009; Fisman & Gatti, 200 ). The contested idea in this 3 
literature is that political accountability at the sub-national level can increase the voters’ 4 
ability to punish corrupt politicians, as the voters can better monitor and evaluate the corrupt 5 
politicians’ performance relative to that of national politicians. A contrasting view holds that 6 
decentralization can instead generate unintended consequences such as patronage-based 7 
politics, capture by local elites and interest groups, and a new set of winners and losers at the 8 
sub-national level (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2000; Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis, 2016; 9 
Prud’Homme, 1995). All of these can, in turn, weaken the intended monitoring mechanisms 10 
at the sub-national level resulting in localized corrupt patronage networks and hence 11 
decentralized corruption (D’Arcy and Cornell, 2016; Véron, Williams, Corbridge, and 12 
Srivastava, 2006). It is not surprising, therefore, that the decentralization literature on 13 
corruption documents mixed empirical findings. Most importantly, however, there is no 14 
known decentralization study on corruption that incorporates accounting as a crucial source 15 
of monitoring information, and the reverse is also true.3 We build upon these studies by 16 
incorporating accounting in our analysis, using recent data and alternative measures of 17 
decentralization. 18 
Third, we extend on a nascent but growing body of literature that questions the implicit 19 
assumption that there is a direct relationship betwe n decentralization and corruption. This 20 
body of literature suggests that other underlying mechanisms, such as political competition 21 
and a free press, determine the influence of decentralization on corruption and could help 22 
                                                 
3 A comprehensive literature search revealed that most studies focus on financial and management 
accounting in local authorities but do not examine the impact of accounting practice on corruption (e.g., Anessi‐
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disentangle the mixed results reported in the literature (e.g., Albornoz & Cabrales, 2013; 1 
Lessman & Markwardt, 2010; Kyriacou & Roca-Sagalés, 2011a, 2011b). Notwithstanding 2 
this, however, we argue that the quality of accounting information in a country determines the 3 
effectiveness of decentralization monitoring mechanisms. We posit that, in countries with 4 
high-quality accounting practices, decentralization monitoring mechanisms are likely to be 5 
more effective because voters, political competitors r the press can uncover easily 6 
corruption scandals and rent-seeking schemes that increase the likelihood that incumbent 7 
corrupt politicians will be punished in the ballot box by being voted out of office. 8 
Conversely, in countries with weak-quality accounting practices, corrupt politicians can 9 
easily withhold, disaggregate or manipulate monitoring information to conceal their rent-10 
seeking behaviour making it difficult for voters to punish them in the ballot box and thereby 11 
rendering decentralization monitoring mechanisms ineffective in countering corruption. Thus, 12 
there is a plausible complementarity relationship between the quality of accounting practice 13 
and decentralization that might better explain observed variations in corruption across 14 
countries.  15 
The novel contribution of our paper, therefore, concer s this plausible connection 16 
between the hitherto separate accounting and decentraliza ion literature on corruption. To the 17 
best of our knowledge, this is the first cross-country study to document a differential impact 18 
of decentralization on corruption conditional on the quality of the accounting practice in a 19 
country. We construct a cross-sectional dataset from different sources of data comprising a 20 
representative sample of up to 128 countries. In our analysis, we address endogeneity 21 
concerns and use both ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) 22 
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In summary, our main results show that when analysed separately and together without 1 
interaction terms, both accounting and decentralization are positively associated with 2 
reducing corruption. However, these results change remarkably when interaction terms are 3 
included in the analysis. We find that decentralization has a negative and decreasing net 4 
effect on reducing corruption among countries with weak-quality accounting practices but 5 
that it has a positive and increasing net effect on reducing corruption among countries with 6 
high-quality accounting practices. When we include controls for accounting systems and 7 
cultural dimensions, we find that countries that have ccrual accounting systems and low 8 
power distance are likely to be less corrupt. Most importantly, the inclusion of these variables 9 
reinforces and strengthens our complementarity hypot esis but, at the same time, eliminates 10 
the impact of press freedom and reduces those of other popular determinants of corruption. 11 
These results are robust to endogeneity tests, altern tive measures of accounting, 12 
decentralization, and corruption, and to different econometric approaches. Our results 13 
highlight the important role of accounting information in determining the effectiveness of 14 
decentralization in countering corruption. 15 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we review the 16 
accounting and decentralization corruption literature. Section three outlines our hypothesis. 17 
Section four identifies the sources of data, describes the variables and discusses the empirical 18 
approach. Section five reports the results from ourempirical analysis, and section six 19 
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2.   Prior literature  1 
2.1   Accounting practice and corruption 2 
Accounting is considered an essential part of the NPM development, as it is a crucial 3 
source of monitoring information and thus an important corruption barrier. The reason 4 
accounting is considered in this way is because a good accounting system arguably plays an 5 
integral role in the development of a country’s accountability framework (Everett et al., 6 
2007) and is an important anchor upon which a country’s national integrity system can be 7 
established (Doig & McIvor, 2003; Pope, 2000). It is for these reasons that organizations, 8 
such as the World Bank, IMF, and International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), 9 
recommend that countries adopt high-quality accounting practices, one aspect of which is a 10 
shift from a cash basis to accrual basis accounting systems. This accounting basis shift is 11 
based upon the argument that accrual-based accounting systems provide credible accounting 12 
information with more disclosures (than cash basis sy tems provide) that can be used to 13 
ensure the ‘financial accountability’ and the ‘political accountability’ of decentralized units 14 
of government (e.g., Mack & Ryan, 2006; Pina & Torres, 2003; Stanley, Jennings, & Mack, 15 
2008). Theoretically, it is argued that accrual-based accounting systems can help reduce 16 
agency conflicts arising from information asymmetries between politicians (principals) and 17 
voters (agents) (Banker & Patton, 1987; Zimmerman, 1977).4 In this respect, accrual-based 18 
financial statements can reduce information cost and by ensuring the regular and timely 19 
production and audit of accounting information, can in turn increase the stakeholders’ 20 
monitoring incentives, thereby helping to deter corruption.  21 
                                                 
4 For a detailed theoretical discussion on the application of agency theory to describe the role of 
accounting information in reducing information asymmetry between politicians and voters, please see Banker 
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A growing number of countries have implemented various accrual accounting 1 
frameworks, such as IPSAS (IFAC, 2016; Moretti, 2016)5, and recent worldwide statistics 2 
also show that adoption rates are high among decentralized government units relative to that 3 
of central governments (Christiaens, Reyniers, & Rollé, 2010; Christiaens et al., 2015; Pina et 4 
al., 2009). One reason for this high uptake might be he increased accountability pressure on 5 
decentralized governments from different stakeholders, including local citizens, central 6 
government, and financial resource providers. Gore (2004), for example, finds that compared 7 
to those local governments with low-debt levels, loca  governments with high debt levels tend 8 
to produce high-quality accounting information that conforms to Generally Accepted 9 
Accounting Principles (GAAP). This is because such a crual-based accounting systems can 10 
enable local governments to improve the quality of accounting information and transparency, 11 
thereby helping them discharge their accountability obligations (Brusca & Martinez, 2016).  12 
However, accrual accounting adoption by a country in itself does not necessarily 13 
guarantee high-quality accounting practice; indeed, the quality of accounting information 14 
depends largely on the reporting and monitoring incentives of bureaucrats and politicians, on 15 
one side, and the demand for information by different stakeholders and their monitoring 16 
incentives, on the other side (e.g., Baber & Sen, 1984; Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Evans & 17 
Patton, 1987; Ingram, 1984). In this respect, what s become evident is that there are 18 
substantial disparities between countries in the extent of implementation and depth of 19 
application of accrual accounting concepts, owing to differences in domestic reporting and 20 
monitoring incentives, which ultimately influence the quality of accounting practice in a 21 
                                                 
5 For example, a recent study from IFAC and the OECD shows that about 75% of OECD Countries 
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country (e.g., Brusca & Condor, 2002; Christensen et. al., 2015; Pina et. al., 2009).6 We 1 
might, therefore, expect the impact of accounting on corruption to also vary between 2 
countries with a high-quality accounting practice and those with a weak-quality practice.  3 
In the literature, an empirical determination of the relationship between an accounting 4 
practice and corruption has been debated with mixed findings. On the one hand, several 5 
cross-country studies explicitly examine the effect of different proxies of high-quality 6 
accounting practices on corruption. Using the Center for International Financial Analysis 7 
Research’s (CIFAR) reporting index, the concentration of accountants and a composite index 8 
derived from these two variables, Kimbro (2002) finds that countries with high scores of 9 
these three measures are less likely to be corrupt. Malagueño et al. (2010) report similar 10 
results, using two different proxies, namely, the World Economic Forum index of the strength 11 
of accounting standards and the percentage of firms audited by BIG4 accounting firms in a 12 
country. In a more recent study, Houqe and Monem (2016) show that countries with a long 13 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) experience and those with high scores in 14 
the World Bank's minority shareholders financial disclosure index have lower scores of 15 
perceived corruption.7  16 
On the other hand, however, some studies argue that accounting practice and ‘accounting 17 
assemblages’ can be problematic in the fight against corruption (e.g., Everett et al., 2007; 18 
Hoskin, 2015; Neu et al., 2013a, 2013b, 2015; Roberts, 2015). For example, Neu et al. 19 
(2013a, 2013b) use a case study of a Canadian government sponsorship program to show 20 
                                                 
6 Brusca and Condor (2002) identify eight possible reasons why the harmonization of national 
accounting systems with international accounting systems might be difficult to achieve: political and 
administrative environment, interests and the formation of professionals, public accounting regulatory 
mechanisms, sources of financial resource, key users of financial reports, the objectives of public financial 
reporting, the organisation of the public sector and the legal system. 
7 The World Bank financial disclosure measure captures the extent to which minority shareholders are 
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how accounting actors play a salient role in facilitating networks of corruption and how 1 
accounting practices can be manipulated to avoid detection8. Using the case of a protracted 2 
fight against corruption in Italy, Sargiacomo et al. (2015) show that ‘accounting assemblages’ 3 
are by themselves not sufficient corruption barriers but, rather, that there must be the political 4 
will to enforce these barriers. These latter series of studies bring to bear the fact that 5 
corruption can be deeply entrenched, even in countries with high-quality accounting practices 6 
and that publicising accounting information and encouraging more citizens to evaluate it can 7 
help counteract corruption (Johnston, 2015). We conjecture that high-quality accounting 8 
practices can complement decentralization monitoring mechanisms because citizens who 9 
benefit directly from local services are more likely to be willing to evaluate the performance 10 
of a local politician.   11 
2.2  Fiscal decentralization and corruption 12 
The aim of decentralization—that is, the transfer of p wer and responsibility for public 13 
services from the central government to independent or semi-autonomous regional and local 14 
governments—is to improve governance by providing mechanisms for continuous 15 
consultation and closer monitoring at smaller levels of government (Faguet, 2004, 2014; 16 
World Bank, 2001). Thus, decentralization is also an important anti-corruption NPM 17 
development, and most supranational organizations, such as the World Bank, have continued 18 
to support decentralization and local governance projects across the world, especially among 19 
the developing countries (e.g., United Cities & Local Government, 2008; Zhou, 2009).  20 
                                                 
8 Neu et al. (2013b) identify two ways in which accounting practice is used for corruption purposes: (1) 
the skillful use of accounting, where simple bookkeeping techniques and discretionary powers are exploited to 
manipulate accounting information; and (2) the organis tional ability of the accounting practice, where 
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One theoretical underpinning of this policy intervention is that decentralization combined 1 
with local democracy can help reduce political accountability agency problems (see, e.g., 2 
Persson & Tabellini, 2002; Seabright, 1996).9 The idea is that, at smaller levels of 3 
government, monitoring by voters is likely to be more effective because the voters are 4 
equipped with “better information about the local performance”, they “are able to attribute 5 
credit or blame”, and they “are able to coordinate on a voting strategy” to discipline the local 6 
politician (Fan et al., 2009, p.19). At smaller levels of government, political accountability 7 
can increase because both the local politician and the voter have an informational advantage 8 
and an incentive (Bardhan, 2002). However, conflicting theories postulate that 9 
decentralization can instead exacerbate corruption because local bureaucrats might face more 10 
pressing demands from local interest groups than national bureaucrats face and may thus be 11 
more susceptible to control by local elites (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2000; Prud’Homme, 12 
1995; Reinikka & Svensson, 2004). Two groups of empirical studies document the 13 
association between decentralization and corruption.  14 
Although resulting in unclear findings, one group of studies investigates the unconditional 15 
(direct) association between fiscal decentralization and less corruption. For example, after 16 
controlling for various socioeconomic factors, de Mllo and Barenstein (2001) and Fisman 17 
and Gatti (2002) find that more fiscally decentralized countries, as measured by the ratio of 18 
total subnational revenue/spending to total governmnt revenue/spending, are less likely to be 19 
corrupt. Dincer, Ellis, and Waddell (2010) use a yardstick inter-jurisdictional competition 20 
model to show that expenditure decentralization canreduce corruption because voters, 21 
putting pressure on local political actors to perform, tend to compare the performance of the 22 
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politicians in their region with that of the politicians of other neighbouring regions. Similarly, 1 
Arikan (2004) uses a tax-competition model to show that when there is competition for 2 
mobile capital between sub-national governments, political actors tend to be less corrupt.10 3 
However, other studies report mixed findings. For example, Treisman (2000) finds that 4 
countries with a federal government structure experience higher corruption relative to that 5 
experienced by countries with a unitary government structure.  6 
Using several measures of both decentralization and corruption, Freille et al (2007a) find 7 
that fiscal decentralization and constitutional centralization reduce corruption, but they also 8 
find that the positive impact of constitutional centralization diminishes in the presence of 9 
other forms of political decentralization. Similarly, Fan et al. (2009) also use different 10 
measures of both decentralization and corruption and lthough they report that fiscal 11 
decentralization reduces corruption, they also find that a large number of government or 12 
administrative tiers increase corruption. Lessman and Markward (2010) find that the presence 13 
of a federal constitution, the number of tiers of gvernment and the percentage of subnational 14 
employees have no significant effects on corruption. More recently, D’Arcy and Cornell 15 
(2016) use a recent elaborate fiscal decentralization situation in Kenya to show how 16 
devolution of central government functions resulted in a decentralization of patronage 17 
networks and corruption.   18 
Another group of studies considers the influence of other determinants of corruption on 19 
the relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption. Pointing out the importance 20 
of political institutions in this relationship, Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) suggest that 21 
                                                 
10 She finds a weak association between the decentralization measure, the share of non-central 
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decentralization benefits are conditional on the eff ctiveness of political accountability at the 1 
local level. In their study, they find that the impact of fiscal decentralization on corruption 2 
increases in countries with strong political parties (legislature fragmentation) but that 3 
administrative subordination (appointment of officials by higher levels of government) has no 4 
effect. Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés (2011a) find that fiscal decentralization is positively 5 
associated with government quality (control of corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality, and 6 
government effectiveness) but that this positive influence diminishes when fiscal 7 
decentralization interacts with political decentraliz tion (sub-national elections). In a closely 8 
related study (Kyriacou & Roca-Sagalés, 2011b), these authors also report similar results 9 
when they combine fiscal decentralization with indicators of regional elections and multi-10 
level government. Albornoz and Cabrales (2013) provide a theoretical model of political 11 
competition and show that fiscal decentralization is more effective in reducing corruption 12 
when combined with greater degrees of political freedom. Focusing on the role of 13 
information freedom, Lessman and Markwardt (2010) argue that successful decentralization 14 
depends not only on the presence of effective bureauc atic monitoring mechanisms but also 15 
on the free flow of information in a country. They find that decentralization has a positive 16 
impact in countries with high degrees of press freedom and a negative effect in those with 17 
low degrees of freedom. Elsewhere, this complementary role of a free press has also been 18 
reported in studies that examine the relationship between democratization and corruption 19 
(Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2015; Chowdhury, 2004; Vadlamannati & Cooray, 2016). 20 
Having reviewed the literature we note that both accounting practice and fiscal 21 
decentralization are positively associated with less corruption; however, their combined 22 
effect on corruption has not been explored in the extant literature. We contribute to closing 23 
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into one model to evaluate their combined impact on c rruption. In this respect, we include 1 
an interaction term in our analysis to inquire whether the impact of decentralization on 2 
corruption is likely to be greater in countries that ve high-quality accounting practices than 3 
in those that have weak-quality accounting practices.  4 
3.  Hypothesis development 5 
In this section, we discuss how a complementary relationship between high-quality 6 
accounting practices and decentralization might better xplain variations in corruption across 7 
countries. Complementarity is apparent in both the oretical underpinnings and the 8 
empirical analyses of the accounting and decentralization corruption literature. For example, 9 
the common control variables used in the two strands of literature examined in this study 10 
include those that measure the level of economic development (Gross Domestic Product per 11 
capita and government size), the enforceability of c ntracts (rule of law, and voice and 12 
accountability), and autonomy (political system and civil liberty).11 Since these common 13 
variables are important correlates of both accounting and decentralization, there is reason to 14 
believe that accounting and decentralization can have complementary influences on 15 
corruption and that this could also vary remarkably across countries. We posit that high-16 
quality accounting practices help voters or political competitors to uncover corruption 17 
scandals and rent-seeking behaviour and that this information increases the likelihood that 18 
corrupt politicians will be removed from office. The literature provides several clues on why 19 
the quality of the accounting practices in a country might complement the effect of 20 
decentralization in reducing corruption. 21 
                                                 
11 Although different additional control variables are used within and across the two strands of 
literature, most of these variables are either barely significant or have trivial impacts. The additional control 
variables used in the decentralization literature include measures of population, government size, openness to 
trade, ethnic fractionalization, and press freedom. Those used in the accounting literature include cultural 
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First, the role of political competition and monitor ng incentives has been revealed. 1 
Because political competition enhances government openness, it can not only increase the 2 
impact of decentralization on corruption (Albornoz & Cabrales, 2013; Enikolopov & 3 
Zhurauskaya, 2007) but it can also increase the probability of adopting modern accounting 4 
methods (Baber & Sen, 1984; Carpenter, 1991) and politicians’ incentive to provide 5 
monitoring information (Baber, 1983). Therefore, if political competition is intense in a 6 
country, incumbent politicians are likely to face a greater threat of removal from office, while 7 
voters and political competitors are also likely to demand more monitoring information. In 8 
response, incumbent politicians are likely to adopt high-quality accounting practices that 9 
guarantee credible and verifiable accounting information (Carpenter & Feroz, 1992). Thus, 10 
high-quality accounting practices can allow the incumbent politicians to better demonstrate 11 
their political accountability and fend off political competitors, thereby increasing further the 12 
effectiveness of decentralization monitoring mechanisms in curbing corruption. Conversely, 13 
however, incumbent politicians are also likely to impede the adoption of modern accounting 14 
practices or enforcement mechanisms to defeat theirpurpose, especially in countries with 15 
deeply rooted political connections and vote-buying schemes (Cruz, Keefer, & Labonne, 16 
2016; Kramon, 2016; Singer, 2009; World Bank, 2017). In this case, the resulting weak-17 
quality accounting practice can provide opportunities for incumbent politicians to withhold, 18 
disaggregate or manipulate monitoring information t conceal their rent-seeking behaviour, 19 
which can weaken the role of decentralization monitoring mechanisms in reducing 20 
corruption.  21 
Second, studies have emphasized the impact of reporting and monitoring incentives of 22 
bureaucrats and appointed officials. Bureaucrats produce, control and have unfettered access 23 
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application of high-quality accounting practices (Giroux & Shields, 1993; Ingram, 1984; 1 
Zimmerman, 1977). If the benefits (e.g., promotion, recognition or wages) outweigh the costs 2 
of monitoring politicians (e.g., being fired or demoted), bureaucrats have greater incentive to 3 
provide monitoring information to voters and political opponents (Zimmerman, 1977). This 4 
argument is consistent with the finding that civil-service pay, and corruption are positively 5 
correlated (Van Rijckeghem & Wader, 2001). Similarly, if a country has strong accounting 6 
controls and audit mechanisms (Baltaci & Yilmaz, 2006; Giroux & Shields, 1993), the 7 
bureaucrats’ reporting incentives are likely to be gr ater, as the bureaucrats have minimal 8 
control over monitoring information and are thus more likely to be willing to share this 9 
information with voters and political opponents. Therefore, if decentralization increases the 10 
bureaucrats’ reporting and monitoring incentives at the local level (Fisman & Gatti, 2002; 11 
Tabellini, 2000), we should expect this to be more eff ctive in countries with a high-quality 12 
accounting practice than in those with a weak-quality practice. 13 
Third, the press has been shown to have an incentive to monitor politicians and to play an 14 
important role in promoting good governance and controlling corruption by raising awareness 15 
about the impact of corruption and by investigating and reporting incidences of corruption 16 
(see e.g., Brunetti & Wader, 2003; Charron, 2009; Freille, Haque, & Kneller, 2007b; 17 
Stapenhurst, 2000). A strong press can, therefore, influence the level of disclosures because 18 
the press can demand more information to meet their monitoring incentives or because 19 
politicians may be willing to provide information as a self-defence mechanism (Ingram, 20 
1984) or to implement laws that enhance information access (Berliner & Erlich, 2015). As a 21 
result, the press can not only help reduce voters' total information cost of monitoring 22 
politicians but also increase the cost of corrupt behaviour for the politician or bureaucrat 23 
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Furthermore, it is also evident that publicizing accounting information, such as audit 1 
reports, can influence the electoral performance of incumbent politicians and that the 2 
likelihood of losing office increases even more when there is extensive coverage of such 3 
information in local newspapers and radio stations (Costas-Pérez, Solé-Ollé, & Sorribas-4 
Navarro, 2012; Ferraz & Finan, 2008;  Larreguy, Marsh ll, & Snyder Jr, 2014). As Brender 5 
(2003) suggests, changes in the political environment, nforcement of audit and financial 6 
reporting requirements, and the status of local media can in combination determine the 7 
likelihood of re-election during sub-national elections. In contrast, however, a weak press 8 
makes it easy for corrupt politicians to deflect, hide or suppress incriminating information to 9 
avoid public scrutiny, thereby resulting in weak-quality accounting practices and high 10 
information costs (Charron, 2009; Zimmerman, 1977). For example, politicians can weaken 11 
the monitoring role of the media by offering bribes or lucrative government-related 12 
advertising contracts (di Tella & Franceschelli, 2011; World Bank, 2017). Thus, if 13 
monitoring mechanisms are more effective in countries with a free press, we should expect 14 
the impact of decentralization to be greater in those countries that also have a high-quality 15 
accounting practice. 16 
Finally, the strength of professional accounting and government institutions can impact 17 
the quality of a country’s accounting system. Institutional pressure from well-organized 18 
professional and government institutions, the education l process of participating in 19 
professional activities, and the prestige gained from participating in compliance programmes 20 
or financial reporting practice awards (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Evans & Patton, 1983) are 21 
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disclosure.12 Similarly, a strong central government and independent oversight agencies, such 1 
as supreme audit institutions, anti-fraud agencies and the office of the ombudsman, are likely 2 
to exert more pressure on decentralized governments a d to demand accountability 3 
information (World Bank, 1997, 2001; Santiso, 2006). All of these can reduce voters’ 4 
information cost and increase the effectiveness of decentralization monitoring mechanisms.  5 
In contrast, however, countries with weak professional accounting and government 6 
institutions are likely to have weak monitoring mechanisms, thereby increasing the 7 
information cost of monitoring politicians. In such ountries, there is a high probability that 8 
professional misconduct is not sanctioned, that fraud is covered up through manipulation of 9 
records and that these institutions can also be entangled in networks of corruption (Neu et al. 10 
2013a; Nielsen, 2003). Therefore, because monitoring mechanisms can be intensive in 11 
countries that have strong professional accounting a d government institutions, again, it is 12 
likely that the impact of decentralization is greater in those countries that also have high-13 
quality accounting practices.  14 
Taken together, all the above arguments suggest that the impact of decentralization 15 
monitoring mechanisms can be more effective in countries with high-quality accounting 16 
practices than in those with weak-quality accounting practices. Thus, the hypothesis to be 17 
tested is 18 
Hypothesis: Decentralization has a more positive influence on reducing corruption in 19 
countries with a high-quality accounting practice than in countries with a weak-quality 20 
                                                 
12 For example, the Certificate of Achievement for Excellence in Financial Reporting Program in the 
US (http://www.gfoa.org/cafr); the Public Finance Innovation Awards in the UK ( 















Page 18 of 48 
 
accounting practice: that is, the impact of decentralization on reducing corruption increases 1 
with the quality of the accounting practice in a country.  2 
4.  Research design 3 
4.1 The data 4 
4.1.1 Variables description 5 
The sources of the data used and how each variable is m asured are outlined in Table 1. 6 
Our key dependent variable is the Transparency Interna ional (TI) Corruption Perception 7 
Index (CPI), TICPI, which ranks countries in terms of the perceived lve s of corruption 8 
among public officials and politicians (Transparency International, 2016). Countries are 9 
ranked on a scale of 0 to 100, with high scores indicating less corruption and low scores 10 
indicating high corruption. The index captures perceptions of business people and country 11 
experts on the level of corruption in the public sector in the respective countries. For 12 
robustness, we first use the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) measure of corruption 13 
provided by the PRS Group.13 This measure is denoted, ICRGCPI, and has a scale ranging 14 
from 1 to 6, with low values representing high corruption. We then use the worldwide 15 
governance indicator for control of corruption, produced by Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kray 16 
(World Bank, 2015). This corruption variable is abbreviated as WBCPI and has a scale 17 
ranging from -2.5 to +2.5, with low values representing weak governance and vice versa. To 18 
allow a comparison with previous studies and between stimates, the three corruption 19 
measures are rescaled to values ranging from 0 (high corruption) to 1 (less corruption).  20 
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To measure the quality of the accounting practice in a country, we use an index produced 1 
by the World Economic Forum that captures perceptions about the strength of financial 2 
auditing and reporting standards (World Economic Forum, 2015). These data are part of the 3 
Executive Opinion Survey of the World Economic Forum and captures the opinions of 4 
business leaders in approximately 141 countries.14 This measure is denoted FARP, with a 5 
scale ranging from 1 (poor) to 7 (best). The World Economic Forum index has been used in a 6 
series of accounting studies (e.g., Karaibrahimoglu & Cangarli, 2016; Kaya & Koch, 2015; 7 
Wysocki, 2004). In addition, we take into account the accounting systems in a country using 8 
two measures: (1) an indicator variable, ACCTBASIS, that takes the value 0 if a country uses 9 
a cash basis or a modified accrual accounting system and the value 1 if it uses an accrual 10 
basis of accounting; and (2) an indicator variable, IPSASADOPTION, that takes the value 1 if 11 
the country has adopted IPSAS as a basis of public sector financial reporting and takes the 12 
value 0 otherwise. These two variables, ACCTBASIS and IPSASADOPTION, are extracted 13 
from a detailed report produced by IFAC on accounting systems and IPSAS adoption across 14 
countries (IFAC, 2016).  15 
There is an inconclusive debate on what constitutes d centralization and how to 16 
measure the degree of decentralization in a country (e.g., Schneider, 2003; Treisman, 2002; 17 
World Bank, 2001). Decentralization can take three different forms, namely, fiscal, political, 18 
and administrative, and these forms might have different impacts on socio-economic 19 
outcomes (Treisman, 2002). To measure the degree of d centralization in a country we use 20 
the share of subnational expenditure in total governm nt expenditure (EXPENDITURE) and 21 
the share of subnational revenue in total government revenue (REVENUE). The two measures 22 
                                                 
14 The Global Competitiveness Report provides a snapshot of a country's productivity and its potential 
to achieve sustainable levels of prosperity and growth, and the report is commonly used by policymakers, 
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are commonly used in the literature and are taken from the IMF’s Government Finance 1 
Statistics (IMF, 2016). For robustness, we use three alternative measures of 2 
decentralization—fiscal, administrative and political—recently produced by Ivanyna and 3 
Shah (2014). 4 
[INSERT TABLE 1 SOMEWHERE HERE] 5 
Although accounting and decentralization have separately been shown to be important 6 
right-hand side variables in corruption analyses, a number of other variables have also been 7 
found to be important determinants of corruption. Following the literature, we include these 8 
control variables to mitigate omitted variable bias. First, we control for the size of a country, 9 
using two variables, namely, government expenditures as a share of the GDP and the log of 10 
the population, due to the following reason: large countries are also likely to be highly 11 
decentralized and it is possible that our model might capture the impact in such countries of 12 
low public services per capita, which may force citizens to engage in corruption in order to 13 
more quickly receive essential public services (Benerjee, 1997; Fisman & Gatti, 2002). 14 
Second, we control for a country’s degree of openness, using the share of imports plus 15 
exports in the GDP. In the absence of this variable, our results can be contaminated since 16 
countries with high-quality accounting practices are also likely to be more open and 17 
competitive—as they can attract larger foreign direct investments—and are thus less corrupt 18 
(Ades & di Tella, 1999).  19 
Third, we include the log of the gross domestic product per capita (in 2005 Dollar) to 20 
control for a country’s level of economic development. Countries with a high GDP per capita 21 
are likely to have strong institutions and accounting traditions, which counteract corruption 22 
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control for a country’s degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, which captures the 1 
likelihood that two individuals picked randomly from a country's population will belong to 2 
different ethnic groups. In our results, this variable controls for the likely impact of ethnicity 3 
on corruption (Maruo, 1995) since decentralization is also typically promoted as a means of 4 
addressing ethnic fractionalization. Fifth, because access to information can inhibit the 5 
monitoring of public officials, we control for a country’s degree of press freedom. As noted 6 
earlier, this variable can explain variations in corruption and is also correlated with 7 
decentralization (Lessman & Markwadt, 2010). Finally, using Hofstede’s (2011) cultural 8 
dimensions, we control for two dimensions of culture, namely, the degree of power 9 
dispersion and individualism in a country, following Houqe and Monem (2016) and Kimbro 10 
(2002), because in large power distance countries, th  acceptance of a hierarchical order and 11 
distinct socioeconomic classes can promote corruption, as appointed officials might feel that 12 
they are entitled to personal benefits (Getz & Volkema, 2001). 13 
4.1.2 Descriptive statistics 14 
The summary statistics for the variables are reportd in Table 2 and 3. In line with the 15 
literature (see e.g., Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Freille et al., 2007a; Lessman and 16 
Markwardt, 2010), our sampling strategy was to include as many countries as the data could 17 
allow. Because we collated our variables of interest and control variables from different data 18 
sources and  these variables are not observable in some countries we ended up with a dataset 19 
that has representative samples of up to 128 countries with varied socioeconomic 20 
characteristics.15 These restricted samples are consistent with those used in the literature, 21 
                                                 
15 The 96 countries in our main sample that do not have missing values for both the accounting practice 
and expenditure decentralization measures include Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
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comprise both developed and developing countries, and are not an issue to our research 1 
approach; on the contrary, they permit us to carry out robustness tests, using different 2 
specifications, and to compare our results with findings in previous studies. From Table 2, we 3 
can see that the means of both the Transparency International (TICPI) and the World Bank 4 
(WBCPI) corruption indices equal to 0.46, while that of theICRG (ICRGCPI) is 0.48, which 5 
is 20 basis points higher but is not significantly different from the TICPI (t= -0.9153, p= 6 
0.3626) or the WBCPI ( t= -1.1682, p= 0.2459). Thus, we should expect our results to be 7 
consistent, regardless of the measure used. On a scale of 1 to 7, on average, the measure of 8 
the accounting practice (FARP) is 4.72, with a standard deviation of 0.91.  9 
Approximately one-fifth of the countries in our sample use an accrual basis of accounting, 10 
while more than one-third have adopted IPSAS as the preferred framework for financial 11 
reporting. The data shows that the average share of both subnational government expenditure 12 
to total government expenditure and subnational government revenue to total government 13 
revenue is approximately 20 percent. However, there are two noticeable outlier countries in 14 
our sample, namely, the United Arab Emirates and China, in which their degree of 15 
expenditure decentralization is 83% and 80%, respectively. In addition, the United Arab 16 
Emirates has an unusual 100% degree of revenue decentralization. However, our results 17 
remain virtually unchanged whether we include or exclude these two outlier countries or any 18 
other country in our sample.  19 
[INSERT TABLE 2 SOMEWHERE HERE] 20 
                                                                                                                                              
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, 
Rep., Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Neth rlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Tajikistan, Thailand, The 
Gambia, Trinidad And Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ugand, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the
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Table 3 reports cross-tabulations of the means of corruption for different groups of 1 
countries and provides a first look at the possible re ationships between our key variables. A 2 
likelihood-ratio test of the null hypothesis of equal corruption means for these different 3 
groups of countries are also reported. In Panel A, countries are split by the quality of their 4 
accounting practice (Weak_FARP, Mid_FARP, and High_FARP) and by the degree of 5 
expenditure and revenue decentralization (low, mid, h gh).16 The results clearly show that 6 
among countries with a high-quality accounting practice, corruption means are significantly 7 
different and increase with the degree of expenditure decentralization (High_FARP); for 8 
countries with low degrees of decentralization, the corruption mean is 0.53, and this increases 9 
to 0.76 for countries with high degrees of decentralization. In contrast, the means of 10 
corruption are not significantly different for countries with either weak (Weak_FARP) or 11 
mid-quality (Mid_FARP) accounting practices.  12 
For revenue decentralization, among countries with mid- (Mid_FARP) and high-13 
quality (High_FARP) accounting practices, the corruption means are significantly different 14 
and increase with the degree of decentralization. In Panel B, countries are split by the quality 15 
of the accounting practice and the accounting frameworks (accrual basis and IPSAS 16 
adoption). We find that among countries with mid- and high-quality accounting practices but 17 
not in countries with weak-quality practices, corruption means are significantly different 18 
between countries that have adopted accrual accounting systems and those that have not. 19 
Corruption means are not significantly different for countries that have adopted IPSAS and 20 
those that have not, regardless of the strength of the accounting practice. Overall, the 21 
corruption means in countries with weak-quality accounting practices are ambiguous.  22 
                                                 
16 We also checked this three grouping of countries using an exploratory cluster analysis (with K=3) 
based on the three key variables of interest in our study (corruption, accounting practice, and decentralization). 
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[INSERT TABLE 3 SOMEWHERE HERE] 1 
In addition, shown in Figure 1 in a scatter plot wih fitted lines, the Transparency 2 
International measure of corruption (TICPI) is plotted against both the measure of 3 
expenditure decentralization and that of revenue decentralization. As in Table 3, in order to 4 
examine the effectiveness of the decentralization mitoring mechanisms, using the variable 5 
FARP, countries are ranked and split into three groups by the quality of their accounting 6 
practice. In the scatter plot, countries with a weak-quality accounting practice (Weak_ FARP) 7 
are indicated by circles and a dotted line with dashes; those with mid-quality (Mid_ FARP) 8 
are indicated by multiplication signs and a continuous line; and those with high quality 9 
(High_ FARP) are indicated by diamonds and a line with small dashes. Again, from this 10 
figure, it is likely that the effectiveness of decentralization monitoring mechanisms in curbing 11 
corruption depends on the quality of the accounting practice in a country. Regardless of the 12 
type of decentralization, countries with a high-quality accounting practice are mainly in the 13 
upper part of the two graphs in Figure 1, those with mid-quality are in the middle, and those 14 
with weak quality are in the lower part of the figure. Most importantly, Figure 1(a) suggests 15 
that among countries with a high quality of accounting practice, the effectiveness of 16 
monitoring mechanisms increases with the degree of the decentralization expenditure. 17 
However, among countries with either a mid- or weak-quality accounting practice, the degree 18 
of decentralization expenditure has a minimal impact on the effectiveness of monitoring 19 
mechanisms. Similarly, Figure 1 (b) suggests that the effectiveness of monitoring 20 
mechanisms increases with the degree of revenue decntralization among countries with a 21 
high- and a mid-quality accounting practice but is trivial with respect to the degree of revenue 22 
decentralization, in those countries with a weak-quality practice.   23 
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4.2   Empirical approach 1 
In our analysis, we employ a lagged structure of the dependent and independent variables. 2 
For the dependent variable, we use averages for the period 2010 to 2015, while for the 3 
independent variables, we use averages for longitudinal ata, covering the period 2000 to 4 
2009, or cross-sectional data reported during this period. This approach has been used in the 5 
literature to handle data gaps and to address endogeity problems (see e.g., Fisman & Gatti, 6 
2002; Lessman & Markwadt, 2010). We use four nested mo els to examine the influence of 7 
the quality of an accounting practice on the relationship between decentralization and 8 
corruption. To permit a comparison with previous studies that analyse the impacts of 9 
accounting and decentralization separately, we first run the following three models:   10 
	
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,					                                   (3)     14 
where the dependent variable, CORRUPTION, is the corruption perception index for country 15 
I, with high values representing less corruption; FARP is a measure of the quality of 16 
accounting practice, while DECENTRALIZATION is a measure of the degree of 17 
decentralization (either expenditure or revenue decentralization) in a country; and 18 
CONTROLS is a vector of country characteristics, as used in both the accounting and 19 
decentralization strands of literature.  20 
To test our complementarity hypothesis, we then include an interaction term between 21 
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of these two variables, we transform the continuous measure of accounting to three dummy 1 
variables, by ranking and splitting countries into three groups, as described earlier. The 2 
regression model is:  3 
	
 	= 	 + 		
 +	_
 +	 !"ℎ_









,																																																									                      (4) 5 
                6 
where Weak_FARP, Mid_FARP, and High_FARP are dummy variables equal to one if a 7 
country is categorized as having a Weak_, Mid_ or High_FARP and equal to zero otherwise. 8 
Countries with a weak FARP are the reference group. Mid_FARP × Decentralization and 9 
High_FARP × Decentralization are interaction terms, and the other variables are as described 10 
before. 11 
Our focus in equation 4 is on the coefficient estima es ,  , and ', which represent 12 
the differential impacts of decentralization in countries with weak, mid and high scores of 13 
FARP. We predict that the coefficient estimate  should be negative—implying that 14 
decentralization is associated with more corruption;   should be either negative (but higher 15 
than ) or positive—indicating that a FARP increases the benefits gained from 16 
decentralization in reducing corruption; and the cofficient estimate ' should be positive but 17 
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gained with a greater quality of accounting practice.  The impact of decentralization should 1 
be an increasing function of FARP so that  < 	+	  < 	+	'. 2 
Although the lagged structure of our dependent and independent variables can help 3 
mitigate endogeneity problems, a major concern is how to establish causal relationships 4 
because corruption and the determinants of corruption are interlinked (see e.g., Arikan, 2004; 5 
Everett et al., 2007; Lessman & Markwardt, 2010). One endogeneity issue in the above 6 
equations exists in the relationship between the lev ls of corruption and the quality of the 7 
accounting practice. As discussed earlier, it is reasonable to suspect that corrupt political 8 
actors might block the adoption of modern accounting systems that guarantee a high-quality 9 
accounting practice, as this will reduce the room t manipulate accounting information and 10 
opportunities for rent seeking. Thus, the direction of causality might run from corruption to 11 
the quality of the accounting practice in a country and not to the reverse. To address this, an 12 
instrument is required that can affect the quality of the accounting practice in a country and 13 
not the level of corruption. The origin of the legal system of a country is one such instrument, 14 
which has been found to determine the accounting systems and the level of market 15 
transparency in a country (Ball, 1995; Nobes, 1998). We use three dummy variables that 16 
represent countries whose legal origin is either comm n law, civil law or a mixture of 17 
different laws. This variable has also been used as an instrument for decentralization (Fisman 18 
& Gatti, 2002).  19 
Another endogeneity issue with our analysis concerns the possibility that national 20 
political actors can frustrate decentralization, to shield their ability to extract rents since 21 
decentralization reduces the resources at their disposal (see e.g., Fisman & Gatti, 2002; 22 
Lessman & Markwardt, 2010). The direction of causation might run from corruption to 23 
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economic changes and not necessarily as a result of decentralization (Bardhan, 2002). 1 
Therefore, the degree of decentralization is determined by corruption and not the reverse, as 2 
we would ideally expect. Again, we need an instrument that can affect the degree of 3 
decentralization in a country but not the level of c rruption. Following the literature, we 4 
choose an instrument for decentralization, using the log of the surface area because the 5 
geographic size of a country determines the degree of d centralization and has no impact on 6 
the level of corruption in a country (Arikan, 2004; Everett et al., 2007; Lessman & 7 
Markwardt, 2010). 8 
5. Empirical results 9 
Table 4 presents our main results in which we report b th the OLS and 2SLS regression 10 
estimates for comparison. In Column (1), we regress corruption against the proxy for the 11 
quality of an accounting practice in a country and the control variables FREEPRESS, 12 
GDPPC, GOVCONEXP, POPULATION, OPENNESS, and ETHNOFRAG. The results show 13 
that the accounting proxy, FARP, is positive and highly significant, in line with e findings 14 
in Kimbro (2002) and Houqe and Monem (2016). Among the control variables, only 15 
FREEPRESS and GDPPC are significant. In Column (2), we replace the accounting proxy 16 
with the degree of expenditure decentralization in a country and include the above control 17 
variables. This variable, expenditure decentralization, is also highly significant and is 18 
consistent with the findings in previous studies (e.g., Kyriacou & Roca-Sagalés, 2011a; 19 
Lessman & Markwardt, 2010). The results for the control variables remain unchanged, but 20 
the variable GOVCONEXP becomes significant at the 10% level when compared to the 21 
results in Column (1). In Column (3), we bring together in one regression our key 22 
independent variables—accounting practice and expenditure decentralization. These two 23 
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corruption. In fact, the explanatory power of this regression increases by 7% and 9%, when 1 
compared to the model results in Column (1) and (2), respectively.  2 
Next, we interact the proxy for accounting practice and the degree of expenditure 3 
decentralization in Columns (4) and (5). The results in Column (4) show that the net effect of 4 
expenditure decentralization is positive and signifcant among countries with a mid- and 5 
high-quality accounting practice. However, the impact of expenditure decentralization is 6 
negative but insignificant among countries with a weak-quality accounting practice. Turning 7 
to the 2SLS regression results reported in Column (5), we can see that the magnitudes of the 8 
impact of decentralization increase across the three g oups of countries and that the levels of 9 
significance also increase for countries with weak- and mid-quality accounting practices. This 10 
finding remains unchanged, even when we include an interaction term between 11 
decentralization and press freedom, in line with Lessman and Markwardt (2010). These 12 
results support our complementarity hypotheses and show that the quality of accounting 13 
practice in a country influences the impact of decentralization in reducing corruption. The 14 
impact of expenditure decentralization is -0.268 in countries with a Weak_FARP; however, 15 
the incremental effect of decentralization is 0.568 (0.300 – -0.268) in countries with a 16 
Mid_FARP and is 1.031 (0.763 – -0.268) in countries with a High_FARP.  17 
[INSERT TABLE 4 SOMEWHERE HERE] 18 
The results for revenue decentralization are reportd in Columns (6) to (9) of Table 4 19 
and are similar to the expenditure decentralization estimates. When analysed separately, the 20 
revenue decentralization variable is positive and highly significant, as shown in Column (6). 21 
In the regression in which we include the proxies for the quality of accounting and revenue 22 
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highly significant. The estimates with interaction terms between revenue decentralization and 1 
the three dummies for the quality of accounting practice are reported in Column (8) and (9). 2 
The results reported in Column (8) show that among countries with a Weak_FARP, the 3 
impact of revenue decentralization is negative. In contrast, among countries with a high-4 
quality accounting practice, the impact of revenue decentralization is positive and highly 5 
significant and among countries with a mid-quality practice, the impact of revenue 6 
decentralization is positive but insignificant. The results for the 2SLS regressions shown in 7 
Column (9) increase in magnitude and level of significance. Again, these results support our 8 
complementarity hypotheses. The impact of revenue decentralization is -0.265 in countries 9 
with a Weak_FARP; however, the incremental effect of decentralization is 0.441 (0.176 – -10 
0.265) in countries with a Mid_FARP and is 1.011 (0.746 – -0.265) in countries with a 11 
High_FARP.17 12 
To better demonstrate the above complementary effect, Figure 2 plots the predicted 13 
probabilities of corruption against the incremental degrees of decentralization for the three 14 
groups of countries split by the quality of accounting practice. The predictions are based on 15 
the 2SLS estimates in Column 5 and 9 of Table 4. As in Figure 1, we can see that countries 16 
with a high-quality accounting practice are predominantly at the top, followed by those with 17 
mid-quality, and that those with weak quality are at the bottom. Figure 2 (a) shows that the 18 
impact of the degree of expenditure decentralization on reducing corruption increases sharply 19 
among countries with a high-quality accounting practice and increases slightly in those with a 20 
mid-quality accounting practice. In contrast, the impact of expenditure decentralization on 21 
reducing corruption decreases in countries with a weak-quality accounting practice. 22 
                                                 
17 Considering that the distribution of our measures of decentralization suggests that a linear regression 
might not be appropriate, as depicted in Figure 4, we checked our results using a log transformation of this 
variable. The results from this robustness test are consistent with the results reported in Table 4 and re available 
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Similarly, Figure 2 (b) shows that the impact of revenue decentralization on reducing 1 
corruption also increases sharply in countries with a igh-quality accounting practice and 2 
increases slightly in those with a mid-quality one but decreases in countries with a weak-3 
quality practice. The predicted probabilities of corruption are significantly different across the 4 
three groups of countries (weak, mid- and high-quality ccounting practices).18 19 5 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 SOMEWHERE HERE] 6 
In the results reported in Table 5, we include additional variables that may be 7 
correlated with both our key variables of interest or corruption. First, we include two 8 
indicator variables to control for the impact of the accounting system adopted by a country, 9 
ACCTBASIS and IPSASADOPTION. As shown in Table 3, corruption means are significantly 10 
different between countries that use a cash-basis and those that use an accrual-basis 11 
governmental accounting system. In addition, althoug  supranational organizations 12 
recommend the adoption of IPSAS in the belief that is can help increase transparency and 13 
accountability, Table 3 suggests that there is no significant difference in corruption means 14 
between countries that have adopted IPSAS and thoseat have not. It is possible that some 15 
countries that opt not to adopt IPSAS already have in place better and more comprehensive 16 
public sector accounting standards (Chan, 2006). Column (1) to (4) of Table 5 report the 17 
                                                 
18 For robustness, we replayed the results reported in Columns 4, 5, 8 and 9 of Table 4 without 
transforming the continuous measure of accounting practice into three dummies. The results from this 
robustness test are similar to those reported in Table 4. In addition, a plot of the marginal effect of 
decentralization on corruption at three representative values of accounting practice (that is, at the mean of the 
estimation sample (4.86), two standard deviations below the mean (3.16) and at two standard deviations above 
the mean (6.56)) reveals fitted lines that are consistent with those reported in Figure 2.  
19 Additionally, to interpret the incremental R-square values appropriately, we fitted nested models 
without transforming the accounting practice index to a categorical variable with three dummies. We thn 
carried out Wald tests to compare the models with in eraction terms to those without by sequentially adding 
blocks of variables including the measures of accounting practice, decentralization and an interaction erm of 
these two variables to a baseline model with control variables only. The F Statistics derived from these 
comparison tests show that the blocks of variables (individual variables) in these nested models are all jointly 
significant and that each block of variables (indivi ual variables) increased the R-square significantly. These 
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estimates that include the accounting basis and the IPSAS adoption dummy variables. 1 
Overall, the results for both the OLS and 2SLS regressions show that the accounting basis 2 
dummy variable is significant and positively associated with less corruption but that the 3 
IPSAS adoption dummy is negative and insignificant. Moreover, the inclusion of these two 4 
variables increases the magnitudes and levels of significance of the interaction terms between 5 
our two decentralization measures and the quality of the accounting practice. The control 6 
variables remain unchanged when compared to the results in Table 4. These results lend 7 
further support to our complementarity hypothesis. 8 
[INSERT TABLE 5 SOMEWHERE HERE] 9 
Additionally, in the results reported in Columns 5 to 8 of Table 5, we include two of 10 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, namely, power distance and individualism, following Kimbro 11 
(2002) and Houqe and Monem (2016). As mentioned earlier, a country’s culture is not only 12 
associated with fiscal decentralization and the adoption of modern accounting practices but is 13 
also linked with corruption. Across all specifications, the power distance variable is negative 14 
and significant, while the individualism variable is positive but insignificant. When compared 15 
to the OLS results in Columns (1) and (3), the OLS results in Columns (5) and (7) show that 16 
these two variables increase the interactive impact of decentralization and an accounting 17 
practice, except in the case of revenue decentralization in countries with a mid-quality 18 
accounting practice, in which the interactive impact of decentralization and an accounting 19 
practice decreases. In the 2SLS regression estimates in Columns (6) and (8), the magnitude of 20 
the impacts of decentralization decline slightly, but the negative impact of revenue 21 
decentralization increases among countries with a weak-quality accounting practice. 22 
Surprisingly, the inclusion of these two cultural dimensions eliminates the impacts of press 23 
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the impacts of the variables ACCTBASIS, IPSASADOPTION, and OPENNESS. Another 1 
important observation is that we now cannot reject the null hypothesis that our key variables 2 
of interest are exogenous, based on Wooldridge’s robust endogeneity test. 20  3 
Next, for robustness, we check further several plausible issues with our analysis and 4 
the consistency of our results, using different measures of corruption and decentralization and 5 
a different econometric approach. 21 The first issue that we check is the consistency of our 6 
results, using two alternative measures of corruption: the International Country Risk Guide 7 
Corruption Perception Index (ICRGCPI) and the World Bank Corruption Perception Index 8 
(WBCPI). The results reported in Table A1 of the Appendix are consistent with those 9 
reported in Columns 5 and 8 of Table 5 and support our general conclusions. Indeed, when 10 
compared to the results in Table 5, the magnitudes and in some cases the levels of 11 
significance increase for our key variables and their interaction terms in both sets of 12 
regressions. The ICRGCPI regressions coefficients have high magnitudes, but the models 13 
have low explanatory power; however, the WBCPI coefficient estimates fall in between those 14 
of the TICPI in Table 5 and the ICRGCPI, with moderate explanatory power. Thus, these 15 
results support and reinforce our conclusion that te quality of accounting practice in a 16 
country increases the decentralization benefits. 17 
Second, because most corruption indices are essentially scores in which countries are 18 
ranked as most corrupt or less corrupt, we check whether the way our dependent variable is 19 
measured might bias our results and whether indeed the corruption index can be considered to 20 
                                                 
20 For robustness, we also used CIFAR’s financial statement standards general index, with a scale 
ranging from 1 (poor) to 100 (best). This composite index is derived from scores based on the inclusion or 
omission of ninety items in the financial statements of a selection of companies in a country. The measure has 
been used in various studies (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 1998; Kimbro, 2002). The results from this 
robustness test are consistent with our main results and are available from the authors.  
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be a continuous variable. To address this concern, we use Ordered Probit regressions to check 1 
the consistency of our results. We transform the corruption index into a categorical variable 2 
by ranking and splitting countries into three groups by the score of corruption: a high-, 3 
medium- and low-level of corruption. The results are reported in Table A2 of the Appendix. 4 
We find that countries with a Mid_FARP and a High_FARP are less likely to have high 5 
corruption and are more likely to have less corruption when compared to countries with a 6 
Weak_FARP. Concerning the net effect of decentralization, we follow Ai and Norton, (2003) 7 
and calculate at different degrees of both expenditure and revenue decentralization, the 8 
marginal effect of a Weak_FARP, a Mid_FARP and a High_FARP on corruption. Figure A1 9 
of the Appendix shows that having a weak-quality accounting practice increases the 10 
probability that a country’s level of corruption is high, and this probability increases with the 11 
degree of decentralization. In contrast, having a Mid_FARP or a High_FARP increases the 12 
probability that a country’s level of corruption is low, and these effects increase with the 13 
degree of decentralization. 14 
Finally, we check whether the decentralization measures that we use capture how 15 
authority is dispersed across countries. It is possible that the share of subnational government 16 
expenditure or revenue are not good indicators of how decision-making is decentralized to 17 
the local level (Bardhan, 2002). As noted by Lessman and Markwardt (2010), for example, a 18 
country such as France has a sub-national government structure but with limited authority, 19 
and this could imply that our results are biased. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, our 20 
sample size is constrained by the available data on fiscal decentralization indicators. For 21 
robustness, we use a recent dataset developed by Ivan na and Shah (2014), which increases 22 
the sample used in the complementarity analysis report d in Table 4 to 128 countries. The 23 
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decentralization. For a detailed discussion on how each index is constructed, see Ivanyna and 1 
Shah (2014).22 Table A3 in the Appendix reports 2SLS regression estimates, using these three 2 
alternative decentralization measures. Among countries with a Weak_FARP, we find that 3 
fiscal decentralization and political decentralization have negative impacts on corruption. In 4 
addition, across the three models, the interaction between the different decentralization 5 
measures and the accounting practice measure are all significant. Compared to the results in 6 
Table 4, the magnitudes of these different decentralization measures and their interaction 7 
terms are generally lower. This is hardly unexpected, as some of the components of the three 8 
decentralization measures may be capturing information that is uncorrelated with corruption. 9 
Nonetheless, these results support our general conclusion that decentralization monitoring 10 
mechanisms are more effective in reducing corruption in countries with high-quality 11 
accounting practices. 12 
6. Discussion and conclusions 13 
Over the last three decades, supranational organizations have promoted accounting and 14 
decentralization as essential anti-corruption mechanisms. The assumption is that a high-15 
quality accounting practice can promote financial controls and reporting, while 16 
decentralization can enhance democratic accountability by facilitating continuous 17 
consultation and a closer monitoring of politicians and bureaucrats at smaller units of 18 
government. Consequently, it is believed that accounting and decentralization promote 19 
                                                 
22 In summary, the fiscal decentralization index is derived using five measures: the fraction of local 
government expenditure to total government expenditure; the fraction of local government development grants 
to total local government revenue; taxation autonomy; the conditionality and predictability of intergovernmental 
transfers; and borrowing freedom. The administrative decentralization index is measured by using the fraction of 
local government employment to total government employment and by the degree of discretion of human 
resource management. The political decentralization index measures how secure the existence of local 
government is, the nature of council elections, the nature of executive elections and whether there is direct 
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transparency and accountability in public sector organizations, thereby reducing corruption. 1 
However, the two strands of literature utilised within this study separately document mixed 2 
empirical evidence. In the accounting literature, particularly studies concerned with public 3 
sector accounting, some studies show that a high-quality accounting practice is associated 4 
with less corruption (Kimbro, 2002; Houqe and Monem, 2016; Malagueño et al., 2010) but 5 
other studies also indicate that accounting can facilitate corruption even in countries with a 6 
presumably high-quality accounting practice (Neu et al. 2013a, 2013b; Sargiacomo et al., 7 
2015). Similarly, there is evidence that supports the argument that fiscal decentralization can 8 
help reduce corruption (de Mello and Barenstein, 2001; Fisman and Gatti, 2002) but findings 9 
elsewhere also show that other forms of decentralization increase corruption (Fan et al., 2009; 10 
Freille et al., 2007a).  11 
In an attempt to clarify further the mixed findings in the decentralization literature, a few 12 
studies have considered the influence of other corruption determinants on the relationship 13 
between decentralization and corruption (e.g., Albornoz & Cabrales, 2013; Lessman & 14 
Markwardt, 2010).  These studies take into account the complex interrelations between 15 
different anti-corruption solutions (Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1995) and demonstrate that the use of 16 
multiple anti-corruption mechanisms is necessary as they complement, rather than dominate, 17 
one another (Lagunes, 2012; World Bank, 2017). However, to the best of our knowledge, 18 
there is no cross-country study that investigates whether there is a plausible interrelationship 19 
between the quality of accounting practice and decentralization and whether they 20 
complement each other in reducing corruption. Our st dy therefore contributes to closing this 21 
gap in knowledge and understanding of their combined effect. Using a cross-section of up to 22 
128 countries and multiple sources of data to examine these relationships we argue that the 23 
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effectiveness of decentralization monitoring mechanisms – voters’ ability to monitor and 1 
punish the politician in the ballot box at the local level.   2 
Overall, we find support for our key complementarity hypothesis that the quality of 3 
accounting practice in a country determines the extent o which decentralization helps to 4 
reduce corruption in that country. Our study makes s veral contributions to the literature. 5 
First, we extend two hitherto separate strands of literature on the relationship between 6 
accounting practice and corruption and the relationship between corruption and 7 
decentralization. To this end, when brought together in one model without interaction terms, 8 
we show that the quality of accounting practice and the degree of decentralization in a 9 
country are positively associated with less corruption. This result is consistent with the 10 
findings in both the accounting (Kimbro, 2002; Houqe and Monem, 2016; Malagueño et al., 11 
2010) and decentralization (e.g. de Mello and Barenstei , 2001; Lessman & Markwardt, 12 
2010) corruption literature. In our case, however, these two variables in combination explain 13 
more variations in the data than documented in the two strands of literature, and this indicates 14 
that models that do not include the two variables ar  likely to be miss-specified. 15 
Second, as discussed in section 2, there is an emerging consensus in the literature that 16 
decentralization is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. In this regard, several studies 17 
have documented the impact of other mechanisms on the relationship between 18 
decentralization and corruption (e.g. Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Freille et al., 2007a; 19 
Lessman and Markwardt, 2010). Our paper builds on these studies by showing that 20 
decentralization only has a positive and an increasing net effect in reducing corruption in 21 
countries that have a high-quality accounting practice, but it has a negative and decreasing 22 
influence in reducing corruption in those that have  weak-quality accounting practice. These 23 
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decentralization and a measure of press freedom (Lessman and Markwardt, 2010). 1 
Additionally, we find that countries with accrual accounting systems and low power distance 2 
culture are less likely to be corrupt and that the inclusion of the two variables increases the 3 
net effect of decentralization and reinforces our complementarity hypothesis. However, in our 4 
analysis adoption of IPSAS has no influence on corruption. Our results are robust whether we 5 
use alternative measures of corruption, accounting or decentralization, different econometric 6 
approaches, and different model specifications. 7 
We conclude that the information role of accounting is crucial for increasing the 8 
effectiveness of decentralization monitoring mechanisms, as it minimizes information 9 
asymmetry between political actors and voters at local levels, thereby increasing political 10 
accountability and reducing corruption. Our results suggest that governments and 11 
supranational organizations should focus more attention on strengthening the quality of 12 
financial reporting standards in order to maximize th  benefits of decentralization in reducing 13 
corruption. The results buttress the commitment recently made by world leaders to develop 14 
high-quality financial information to make institutions become more transparent, accountable 15 
and trusted (World Bank, 2018). The finding that adoption of accrual basis accounting 16 
systems has a positive influence on reducing corruption but that the adoption of IPSAS has 17 
no influence on corruption justifies the position taken by IFAC of recommending a cash-basis 18 
IPSAS as a transitory measure and not as an end by itself as countries work towards adoption 19 
of the full accrual accounting IPSAS. Similarly, because political connections are inevitable 20 
and are likely to be more extensive at local levels, our results suggest that politically 21 
connected firms should adopt high-quality accounting practices in line with the International 22 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) recommendation for small firms to adopt IFRSs for 23 
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political connections to demonstrate financial reporting transparency and to enhance their 1 
credibility, thereby increasing firm valuation and decreasing financing costs (Guedhami, 2 
Pittman, & Saffar, 2014).  3 
In our analysis, however, we do not explicitly test whether there could be a link between 4 
the quality of accounting practice with democratization, a free press, bureaucrats’ incentives, 5 
and the strength of professional and government institutions. Future research can explore 6 
these relationships and their impact on corruption. These factors, in the words of Johnston 7 
(2014), are likely to ‘increase pluralism’, ‘open up safe political and economic space’, 8 
increase ‘reform activism’ and help ‘maintain accountability’ (p.47-48).  Additionally, 9 
because socioeconomic and cultural factors across and within countries influence the scope 10 
and nature of decentralization and accounting practice, the effectiveness of monitoring 11 
mechanisms and the quality of accounting information are likely to vary and so would their 12 
impact on corruption. It might, therefore, be misleading to generalize the results of this study. 13 
In line with recent individual country case studies ( .g. Neu et al., 2013; Sargiacomo, 2015), 14 
future research can exploit within-country variations to investigate further the 15 
interrelationships between different determinants of corruption and hence link their findings 16 
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Data sources and description of the variables. 
Variable Definition Year Source 
Corruption measures    
    TICPI Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (0 = 
highest corruption; 10 = absence of corruption). Rescal d to 





   ICRGCPI International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption 
measure (1 = highest corruption; 6 = absence of corruption). 




   WBCPI World Bank corruption measure (-2.5 = highest corruption; 





Accounting measures    
   FARP An index that measures the strength of financial auditing and 
reporting standards in a country [1 = extremely low; 7 = 





   ACCTBASIS A categorical variable that takes the value 0 if a country uses 
a cash basis or a modified cash-basis accounting system and 
the value 1 if it uses an accrual basis of accounting system 
2007 IFAC 
   IPSASADOPTION A categorical variable that takes the value 1 if a country has 
adopted IPSAS as a basis of financial reporting and t kes the 




   










Control variables    
   POPUL The log of the population   World Bank WDI 




World Bank WDI 




World Bank WDI 
   OPENNESS Imports plus exports as a share of the GDP 1996-
2014 
World Bank WDI 
   ETHNOFRAG The degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization  Ethnologue 
   FREEPRESS The index of freedom of the press (inverted)  Freedom House 
   POWDIST Hofstede’s cultural value that describes the extent to which 
the less powerful members of society accept, expect or 
prefer injustice  
 Hofstede (2011) 
   INDLISM Hofstede’s cultural value that reflects the degree to which 
people in society are primarily concerned with their own 
self-interest over that of the collective 


















Country Count Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
TICPI 128 0.46 0.20 0.19 0.92 
ICRGCPI 112 0.48 0.19 0.14 0.94 
WBCPI 128 0.46 0.22 0.14 0.96 
FARP 128 4.72 0.91 2.49 6.22 
ACCTBASIS 128 0.19 0.39 0 1 
IPSASADOPTION 128 0.31 0.47 0 1 
EXPENDITURE 96 0.20 0.17 0.01 0.84 
REVENUE 92 0.20 0.19 0.01 1.00 
FREEPRESS 128 58.29 21.98 8.00 91.90 
GDPCAPITA 128 12282.60 16510.71 145.49 79165.38 
GOVCONEXP 128 16.47 9.52 5.08 106.27 
POPULTTL (Millions) 128 48.00 162.00 0.28 1330.00 
OPENNESS 128 88.99 52.57 25.17 391.34 
ETHNOFRAG 128 0.42 0.29 0.00 0.97 
POWDIST 73 59.96 21.30 11.00 100.00 
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Table 3  
Cross-tabulations of corruption means by the degree of fiscal decentralization and type of accounting 
systems against the quality of an accounting practice. The likelihood-ratio test is for the null 
hypothesis of equal corruption means across different groups of countries.   
Panel A: Fiscal decentralization 








   
Low 0.31 0.40 0.53 0.39 15.22 0.001 
Mid 0.33 0.45 0.70 0.50 29.93 0.000 
High 0.31 0.45 0.76 0.59 44.30 0.000 
Total 0.32 0.43 0.69 0.49 
LR chi2(2) 1.26 1.18 10.36 






   
Low 0.31 0.39 0.59 0.41 23.66 0.000 
Mid 0.29 0.41 0.67 0.48 30.42 0.000 
High 0.33 0.48 0.78 0.58 40.00 0.000 
Total 0.31 0.43 0.70 0.49 
LR chi2(2) 1.08 5.83 8.8 
p-value 0.583 0.054 0.012       
Panel B: Accounting systems 














Cash 0.32 0.41 0.65 0.45 80.06 0.000 
Accrual 0.32 0.52 0.78 0.64 33.41 0.000 
Total 0.32 0.43 0.69 0.49 
t-value 0.25 -2.33 -3.47 












Not adopted 0.33 0.42 0.71 0.50 83.34 0.000 
Adopted 0.30 0.44 0.66 0.48 35.75 0.000 
Total 0.32 0.43 0.69 0.49 
t-value -0.26 -0.66 0.42 
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Table 4  
OLS and 2SLS regressions examining the separate and combined impacts of an accounting practice and fiscal decentralization on reducing corruption. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parenthesis (***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively).  
Dependent variable: Corruption (TICPI) Accounting  Expenditure Decentralization   Revenue Decentralization 
 OLS  OLS OLS OLS 2SLS  OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) 
FARP 0.080***   0.076***     0.089***   
 (0.014)   (0.016)     (0.015)   
DECENTRALIZATION   0.227*** 0.229*** -0.079 -0.268**  0.139*** 0.152*** -0.123* -0.265*** 
   (0.053) (0.045) (0.102) (0.117)  (0.052) (0.043) (0.066) (0.102) 
Mid_FARP × DECENTRALIZATION     0.180* 0.300***    0.126 0.176 
     (0.093) (0.092)    (0.077) (0.110) 
High_FARP × DECENTRALIZATION     0.468*** 0.763***    0.458*** 0.746*** 
     (0.111) (0.142)    (0.088) (0.135) 
FREEPRESS 0.003***  0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002***  0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
GDPPC 0.042***  0.069*** 0.039*** 0.050*** 0.039***  0.080*** 0.043*** 0.052*** 0.035*** 
 (0.011)  (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) 
GOVCONEXP 0.001  0.004* 0.003* 0.004** 0.005**  0.001 0.001 0.0 5** 0.007*** 
 (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
POPULATION 0.007  -0.005 -0.017** -0.013* -0.013*  0.002 -0.011 -0.003 -0.000 
 (0.008)  (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)  (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
OPENNESS 0.000  -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000  -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ETHNOFRAG 0.009  0.046 0.006 0.004 -0.030  0.041 -0.003 -0.000 -0.042 
 (0.032)  (0.039) (0.033) (0.037) (0.039)  (0.039) (0.032) (0.037) (0.039) 
Constant -0.586***  -0.348** -0.202 -0.012 0.130  -0.486*** -0.312** -0.194 -0.113 
 (0.139)  (0.170) (0.124) (0.142) (0.144)  (0.173) (0.133) (0.138) (0.152) 
Shea’s adjusted partial R-Squared of first-stage reressions:            
    DECENTRALIZATION      0.618     0.641 
    Mid_FARP × DECENTRALIZATION      0.579     0.504 
    High_FARP × DECENTRALIZATION      0.447     0.430 
Wooldridge’s overidentifying restrictions test (p-value)      0.266     0.178 
Wooldridge’s endogeneity test (p-value)      0.012     0.007 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.79  0.77 0.86 0.85 0.84  0.77 0.86 0.85 0.83 
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Table 5 
OLS and 2SLS regressions examining the effect of an accounting practice and fiscal decentralization on reducing corruption, controlling for the impacts of 
the accounting framework and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis (***, **, * represent statistical significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively).  
Dependent variable: Corruption (TICPI) Accounting Framework  Cultural Dimensions 
 Expenditure Decentralization  Revenue Decentralization  Expenditure Decentralization  Revenue Decentralization 
 OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
DECENTRALIZATION -0.127 -0.314***  -0.177** -0.312***  -0.323*** -0.380***  -0.226*** -0.288*** 
 (0.117) (0.118)  (0.077) (0.096)  (0.094) (0.116)  (0.076) (0.080) 
Mid_FARP × DECENTRALIZATION 0.228** 0.351***  0.144 0.211**  0.342*** 0.331***  0.128 0.175* 
 (0.104) (0.095)  (0.087) (0.102)  (0.085) (0.105)  (0.084) (0.096) 
High_FARP × DECENTRALIZATION 0.501*** 0.791***  0.523*** 0.767***  0.646*** 0.762***  0.577*** 0.696*** 
 (0.121) (0.133)  (0.094) (0.119)  (0.121) (0.144)  (0.117) (0.127) 
FREEPRESS 0.002*** 0.002***  0.002*** 0.002***  0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
GDPPC 0.045*** 0.034***  0.042*** 0.028**  0.035** 0.029*  0.031* 0.027* 
 (0.008) (0.010)  (0.009) (0.011)  (0.017) (0.016)  (0.017) (0.016) 
GOVCONEXP 0.005*** 0.005***  0.006*** 0.008***  0.004 0.005*  0.005* 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
POPULATION -0.014** -0.015**  -0.005 -0.002  -0.008 -0.008  -0.0 0 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.011) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.008) 
OPENNESS 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.001*  0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
ETHNOFRAG -0.001 -0.033  -0.011 -0.045  -0.056 -0.077  -0.080 -0.094* 
 (0.035) (0.036)  (0.036) (0.035)  (0.064) (0.059)  (0.057) (0.054) 
ACCTBASIS 0.068*** 0.073***  0.081*** 0.096***  0.092*** 0.095***  0.108*** 0.113*** 
 (0.026) (0.023)  (0.025) (0.023)  (0.032) (0.028)  (0.032) (0.028) 
IPSASADOPTION -0.023 -0.018  -0.015 -0.015  -0.046* -0.045**  -0.037 -0.035 
 (0.017) (0.017)  (0.017) (0.016)  (0.025) (0.022)  (0.024) (0.022) 
POWDIST       -0.002** -0.002***  -0.002** -0.002*** 
       (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
INDLISM       0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
       (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.058 0.203  -0.099 -0.024  0.250 0.319  0.139 0.201 
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Dependent variable: Corruption (TICPI) Accounting Framework  Cultural Dimensions 
 Expenditure Decentralization  Revenue Decentralization  Expenditure Decentralization  Revenue Decentralization 
 OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Shea’s adjusted partial R-Squared of first-stage reressions:            
  DECENTRALIZATION  0.608   0.631   0.730   0.654 
  Mid_FARP × DECENTRALIZATION  0.564   0.492   0.702   0.507 
  High_FARP × DECENTRALIZATION  0.431   0.426   0.590   0.427 
Wooldridge’s overidentifying restrictions test (p-value)  0.319   0.117   0.476   0.443 
Wooldridge’s robust endogeneity test (p-value)  0.004   0.024   0.224   0.576 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.87 0.85  0.87 0.86  0.84 0.83  0.86 0.86 


















OLS and 2SLS regressions examining the impact of accounting practice and decentralization, using 
alternative corruption perception indices. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis (***, **, 
* represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and10%, respectively). 
Dependent variables International Country Risk Guide Corruption 
Perception Index 





















 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
FARP 0.100**    0.101***   
 (0.038)    (0.032)   
DECENTRALIZATION 0.042 -0.777*** -0.744***  0.137 -0.624*** -0.745** 
 (0.122) (0.255) (0.221)  (0.094) (0.154) (0.157) 
Mid_FARP×DECENTRALIZATION  0.746*** 0.686***   0.694*** 0.801*** 
  (0.267) (0.245)   (0.172) (0.175) 
High_FARP×DECENTRALIZATION  1.000*** 1.045***   0.929*** 1.070*** 
  (0.295) (0.284)   (0.206) (0.225) 
IPSASADOPTION  -0.015 -0.043 -0.045*  -0.020 -0.047 -0.048* 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.030)  (0.030) (0.031) (0.027) 
ACCTBASIS  0.037 0.088** 0.095***  0.061 0.104** 0.107*** 
 (0.046) (0.041) (0.035)  (0.040) (0.039) (0.035) 
FREEPRESS 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDPPC 0.039 0.041* 0.052**  0.052** 0.057*** 0.058*** 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.024)  (0.021) (0.020) (0.017) 
GOVCONEXP -0.003 0.003 -0.000  -0.001 0.004 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
POPUL 0.002 0.011 0.004  -0.010 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.013)  (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
OPENNESS -0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ETHNOFRAG -0.043 -0.044 -0.045  -0.076 -0.068 -0.072 
 (0.085) (0.083) (0.078)  (0.074) (0.074) (0.064) 
POWDIST -0.001 -0.002** -0.001*  -0.001 -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
INDLISM 0.001 -0.000 0.000  0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.337 0.086 0.093  -0.318 0.100 0.116 
 (0.360) (0.363) (0.327)  (0.314) (0.306) (0.254) 
Adjusted R2 0.648 0.694 0.677  0.798 0.813 0.812 
Shea’s partial R2 of first-stage regressions:       
DECENTRALIZATION 
Mid_FARP × DECENTRALIZATION 
High_FARP × DECENTRALIZATION 
 0.864    0.864 
 0.775    0.775 
 0.788    0.788 
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Table A2 
Ordered probit regressions examining the impact of he accounting practice and decentralization on corruption. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis (***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively).  
Dependent variable: Corruption (TICPI) Expenditure decentralization  Revenue decentralization 
 Raw  
Coefficient 
Predicted probabilities  Raw  
Coefficient 
Predicted probabilities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DECENTRALIZATION -9.532*** 0.099 -1.079** 0.980*  -12.442*** -0.234*** -2.039*** 2.274*** 
 (3.593) (0.113) (0.454) (0.516)  (3.485) (0.076) (0.588) (0.603) 
Mid_FARP × DECENTRALIZATION 13.514***     30.357***    
 (5.176)     (6.495)    
High_FARP×DECENTRALIZATIONT 26.965***     99.589***    
 (9.770)     (23.202)    
FREEPRESS -0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.001  0.011 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.019) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.031) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
GDPPC 1.422*** -0.048*** -0.113*** 0.161***  4.545*** -0. 063*** -0.169*** 0.232*** 
 (0.468) (0.016) (0.031) (0.042)  (1.075) (0.021) (0.044) (0.051) 
GOVCONEXP -0.042 0.001 0.003 -0.005  -0.361*** 0.005*** 0.013*** -0.018*** 
 (0.081) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009)  (0.102) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) 
POPUL -0.417 0.014* 0.033 -0.047  -0.879* 0.012* 0.033 -0.045 
 (0.294) (0.008) (0.024) (0.032)  (0.533) (0.007) (0.023) (0.029) 
OPENNESS 0.027*** -0.001** -0.002*** 0.003***  0.078*** -0.001** -0.003*** 0.004*** 
 (0.010) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.026) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
ETHNOFRAG -3.412* 0.116** 0.271* -0.387**  -11.418*** 0.159*** 0.424*** -0.583*** 
 (1.826) (0.056) (0.147) (0.196)  (2.872) (0.045) (0.121) (0.130) 
POWDIST -0.025** 0.001* 0.002* -0.003**  -0.071** 0.001** 0.003** -0.004** 
 (0.013) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.029) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
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Table A3 
2SLS regressions examining the impact of accounting practice and decentralization on corruption, 
using alternative measures of decentralization. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis 
(***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively). 






 (1) (2) (3) 
DECENTRALIZATION -0.132** -0.053 -0.156*** 
 (0.054) (0.036) (0.044) 
Mid_FARP × DECENTRALIZATION 0.180*** 0.139*** 0.118*** 
 (0.045) (0.046) (0.027) 
High_FARP × DECENTRALIZATION 0.434*** 0.354*** 0.343*** 
 (0.064) (0.053) (0.049) 
FREEPRESS 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDPPC 0.045*** 0.054*** 0.050*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
GOVCONEXP 0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
POPULATION 0.011** 0.012** 0.015** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
OPENNESS 0.000 0.000** 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ETHNOFRAG 0.000 0.029 0.002 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) 
Constant -0.144** -0.252*** -0.178** 
 (0.073) (0.066) (0.073) 
Shea’s partial R2 of first-stage regressions    
    DECENTRALIZATION 0.783 0.741 0.923 
    Mid_FARP × DECENTRALIZATION 0.742 0.597 0.815 
    High_FARP × DECENTRALIZATION 0.651 0.647 0.712 
Adjusted R-square 0.85 0.85 0.83 
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Figure 2 
Scatter plot of predicted probabilities of corruption against the degree of fiscal 
decentralization and the quality of the accounting practice.  
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Figure A1 
Predicted probabilities of corruption  
 
 
 
